Like competitors Microsoft Azure and Google Cloud, AWS provides a baseline level of support for IAM optimized for just its environments. The Amazon Shared Responsibility Model makes it clear the company takes care of AWS infrastructure, hardware, software, and facilities, while customers are responsible for securing their client-side data, server-side encryption, and network traffic protection - including encryption, operating systems, platforms, and customer data. It’s clear the company’s approach to IAM, while centralizing identity roles, policies, and configuration rules, does not go far enough to deliver a fully secure, scalable, zero trust-based approach. While the concept of a shared responsibility model is useful, it’s vital to look beyond cloud platform providers’ promises based on the framework.Īmazon’s interpretation of its shared responsibility model is a prime example. Taking the SolarWinds lessons into account, every organization needs to verify the extent of the coverage provided as baseline functionality for IAM and PAM by cloud vendors. The State of Cloud Security Concerns, Challenges, and Incidents Study from the Cloud Security Alliance found that use of cloud providers’ additional security controls jumped from 58% in 2019 to 71% in 2021, and 74% of respondents are relying exclusively on cloud providers’ native security controls today. The SolarWinds hack occurred in an industry that relies considerably on cloud providers for security control.Ī recent survey by CISO Magazine found 76.36% of security professionals believe their cloud service providers are responsible for securing their cloud instances. Cloud providers do their part - to a point
SOLARWINDS BREACH CODE
That is what makes eradicating the SolarWinds code and malware problematic, as it has infected 18 different Orion platform products. The incursion is particularly notable because SolarWinds Orion is used for managing and monitoring on-premises and hosted infrastructures in hybrid cloud configurations. The SolarWinds hack shows what happens when bad actors focus on finding unprotected threat surfaces and exploiting them for data using stolen privileged access credentials.
SOLARWINDS BREACH HOW TO
They also learned how to compromise SAML signing certificates while using the escalated Active Directory privileges they had gained access to. The bad actors methodically studied how persistence mechanisms worked during intrusions and learned which techniques could avert detection as they moved laterally across cloud and on-premises systems.
SOLARWINDS BREACH SOFTWARE
In brief, advanced persistent threat (APT) actors penetrated the SolarWinds Orion software supply chain undetected, modified dynamically linked library (.dll) files, and propagated malware across SolarWinds’ customer base while taking special care to mimic legitimate traffic.
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